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Abstract - The geoscience record is constrained by the limitations of human thought 
and of the technology for handling information. IT can lead us away from the tyranny 
of older technology, but to find the right path, we need to understand our own 
limitations. Language, images, data and mathematical models, are tools for expressing 
and recording our ideas. Backed by intuition, they enable us to think in various 
modes, to build knowledge from information and create models as artificial views of a 
real world. Markup languages may accommodate more flexible and better connected 
records, and the object-oriented approach may help to match IT more closely to our 
thought processes. 
 
Key Words - Thought processes, human communication, geoscience markup 
language, object-oriented analysis. 
 
 
1. Communication at the interface 
 
1.1 Interwoven threads 
 
A great deal is lost when we force our thoughts into the straitjacket of shared 
conventional records (part I, section 6). Imagine yourself leading a geological field 
excursion. You would certainly talk, producing strings of words - narrative 
descriptions, accounts of sequences of events, reasoning and explanations. You would 
weave the ideas together to tell a story, probably supplementing the narrative with 
gestures, pointing to features of interest and drawing diagrams, perhaps with a stick in 
the sand. You might look at detail with a hand lens, then stand back to see the wider 
picture. You might refer to recorded knowledge: “I will read you a brief account of 
the regional geology; you can see where we are on this map”. You might pass on tacit 
knowledge by demonstration: “look at the outcrop here and you will see what I 
mean”. 
 
The spatial context of your observations and hypotheses gives them coherence, but 
the narrative is essential to tie the elements together. You might cope with leading a 
field excursion with a broken arm, but would have problems if you lost your voice. 
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Different parts of the brain focus on different types of information, but given the 
opportunity, they work together for a clearer view of the big picture (or the big story). 
 
Our experiences may be single sequences of events, put in words as a narrative thread. 
Repetitive events, like seeing a similar sequence of beds again and again, merge into a 
single strand, with only exceptions (the fossiliferous bed) remembered separately. In 
our memories, the threads are woven together as a complex fabric. Our brains are 
constantly trying to make sense of our experience by drawing analogies, abstracting 
and summarizing. The result is ideas with form and structure. We have each built our 
own background understanding or world view that provides the frames (K 1.2) in 
semantic memory where we can accept and evaluate new ideas.  
 
The ability to integrate information types, so important in the field, is hampered by 
the need to package recorded information in separate containers for narrative (books 
and reports), spatial information (maps), data (databases) and discourse (discussions). 
We therefore need to look more closely at what we are trying to do and how we might 
prefer to do it. 
 
Three long-standing tools for sharing knowledge, as well as helping individuals to 
develop and organize their own thoughts, are language, image and demonstration. 
Two more recent tools are mathematical methods and computer software. These tools 
shape the way we think and what we think about, as well as the way we perceive the 
world. They correspond to different information types (text, spatial, tacit and 
structured information) and lead to different styles of thought, presentation and 
processing procedures. The earlier techniques evolved so long ago that we have lost 
sight of their origin, but in planning for new technology we must bear in mind their 
characteristics. The Encyclopedia Britannica (1973, Language) is as always helpful 
on such matters. 
 
1.2 Language and narrative 
 
Long ago and far away, our ancestors grunted and made noises, and then sequences of 
grunts, ascribed meaning to them, and evolved a living language - a sequence of 
tokens denoting objects, actions and agents. At a similarly primitive level, our 
ancestors looked around them, scratched maps on the sand, drew pictures on the cave 
walls. Spoken language could be used for discussion and command. It was a means of 
communicating to a group, for the speaker could broadcast the same message to all 
within earshot. Images were at first a secondary, more personal communication, 
directed to a select few, and requiring special skills even to draw crude sketches. But 
suppose early man could have broadcast not just to the ears but also to the eyes of his 
colleagues, with the ability to capture, record and communicate images in full detail 
to one and all. Methods of communication would surely have evolved differently. 
That power, denied to our forebears, is now available to us. Does it make a 
difference? Has an optimal system evolved naturally, or are we constrained by 
historical accidents? 
 
Leatherdale (1974) pointed out that sixteenth-century philosophers assumed that, in 
experience, we always encounter well-defined or discrete “things”, and that they 
seemed to conceive of the business of language as the adroit matching of words to 
these separately given things of which they are the mark or sign.  The more recent 
Loudon, T.V., 2000. Geoscience after IT: Part J  (postprint, Computers & Geosciences, 26(3A)) 
 
view is that language can be explained in terms of socially agreed understanding of 
words: not on any intrinsic connection between signs and the world, as that would 
imply absolute properties of language independent of human culture.  Contexts need 
to be invented, and stories created, to make a character string meaningful (Laszlo, 
1972). 
 
In evolutionary terms, episodic memory (I 4) presumably developed as a means of 
learning from one’s own experiences - a single thread of events winding through the 
continuum of space along the arrow of time. Language matches this pattern of thought 
with linear strings of words and sentences, referring to past, present and future. 
Narrative skills evolved to create stories as surrogates for experience, told, retold and 
remembered (inaccurately). The story that began as a surrogate experience may by 
constant reworking acquire the mythic quality of a folk tale. It generalizes by pulling 
out crucial, illuminating events, implying much more than it states by reacting with 
existing ideas in the listeners’ minds and influencing their semantic memories. 
 
From speech, written language evolved to reach a multitude of users separated in 
space and time. External representation of knowledge (outside the human mind), for 
example by writing and drawing, goes far beyond the here-and-now of story telling.  
Scientists, in building their knowledge base, are not limited to their own episodic 
memory. They can contribute to and access a vast repository of information.  They 
can do so at a time and place of their choosing, examining a wide range of specialized 
sources, past and present, in summary and in detail.   
 
Faced with the infinite complexity of the real world, a complete description of it is 
unthinkable. Instead, stories are told in innumerable ways, to illustrate a multitude of 
experiences from personal viewpoints. Yet, since they deal with the same reality, all 
refer in a sense to the same underlying story. Because the overall story is large and 
complex, scientists must specialize in subdisciplines. A major part of story telling, or 
scientific writing, is therefore devoted to linking to earlier accounts, establishing 
common ground, clarifying, reconciling inconsistencies, and noting new information, 
discrepancies and ways to resolve them. Discourse, that is, the expression and 
interchange of ideas, is the means of clarifying and reconciling the accounts, by 
discussion within a workgroup, or through the slow process of conventional 
publication. 
 
1.3 Spatial concepts 
 
We can describe spatial pattern and relationships, rather inadequately, in ordinary 
language such as: “filling broad channels from a northerly direction which were later 
buried to a great depth.” However, evolution provided us with specific abilities to 
handle and memorize spatial data (McCrone, 1999). Spatial skills bring evolutionary 
advantages in catching things, or not bumping into them, as in swinging from tree to 
tree, where (with luck) the main sensory input is by eye. We can communicate exact 
and accurate spatial information as images (representations of the semblance or 
likeness of an object), such as diagrams, sketches, maps, photographs and video clips, 
which make use of these skills. Note, however, that losing ambiguity is not always 
helpful. If we depict the channels described at the start of this paragraph on a map, 
they either join up in one direction or the other, or both, or not at all. This might bring 
unwanted connotations of tributaries, deltas, braided streams or whatever. The 
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ambiguous statement may reflect genuine ignorance. The graphical representation can 
force an appearance of certainty that does not reflect the real situation. 
 
Unlike narrative that places events in sequences of single threads, spatial thinking lets 
us build extensive structures, such as geological maps and cross-sections, that give a 
comprehensive view over space and maybe geologic time. We can zoom in to see the 
detail, zoom out to see the spatial context, pan around to see the situation elsewhere, 
and compare spatial patterns arising from different topics. Narrative text cannot offer 
these abilities, but can be intimately linked to a spatial representation.  
 
We can represent spatial forms by combinations of geometrical objects, such as 
points, lines, areas, surfaces, fields and volumes, with well-defined mathematical 
properties. They can therefore be handled precisely on the computer. Within this 
rigorous framework, we can assemble spatial objects drawn from a wide range of 
topics, say, topography, borehole records, formation boundaries, lithologies, 
engineering geology, planning zones and proposed construction sites, and process 
them together. We can visualize the location, spatial patterns and relationships of sets 
of objects using interactive computer displays that take advantage of our spatial skills 
and the accuracy of human short-term memory. Our visual systems have evolved to 
process moving images, helping gannets to catch fish and motorists not to collide. 
Computers can exploit this talent, helping us to visualize changing spatial patterns, 
like the development of a sedimentary basin.  
 
1.4 Structured data 
 
Much more recently than language and images, another type of knowledge 
representation was invented, namely, numerical measurement and quantitative 
modeling (F 1). An advantage of numbers is their ability to define relative magnitudes 
as precisely as required. The eye is adept at comparing two magnitudes, for instance 
the relative sizes of two fossil specimens seen side by side. It is much less skilled at 
comparing objects seen in different places or at different times. Measurement against 
a standard scale uses the numerical series, the most exact order we can form. It 
provides the portable yardstick that makes it possible to assemble any number of side-
by-side comparisons as well as comparing the magnitudes as a group and examining 
subtle variations in space or time (also measured numerically).   
 
Mathematical models (F 5) build on this ability of numbers to represent magnitude, 
and on the similarities between mathematical operations and physical processes. Sets 
of measurements and relationships between them can be summarized, properties can 
be sampled to represent the underlying situation, uncertainty can be measured, states 
can be compared and processes simulated. Practical applications in geoscience, 
including the quantitative description of spatial data and analysis of images, depend 
largely on computer support, and a computer program is a precise and convenient 
means of sharing the model.  
 
Mathematical and spatial models (along with the data collected to investigate them) 
are both analogies (J 2.3) between the real world and the properties of numbers. 
Quantitative properties and relationships can be visualized as patterns in space. The 
map can also be seen as a means of visualization (MacEachern, 1998). We can thus 
bring quantitative and cartographic methods into a single numeric framework. Both 
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analogies are at best fuzzy approximations to the real world, despite the exact 
mathematics of the internal reasoning.  
 
The standards, rules and conventions of the more highly structured areas of the 
information repository add value by creating a coherent and easily accessible 
database, possibly derived from many independent sources. All are ultimately set 
within text narratives, which explain the objectives, the conventions, the reasoning 
and the conclusions. Detailed narrative threads may refer to quite specific spatial 
items or aspects of spatial and quantitative models. The reader should be able to view 
the relevant items highlighted against their spatial context, and be able to move freely 
between the narrative and the visualization. 
 
1.5 Tacit knowledge 
 
Perhaps the greatest amount of geological information is held, not in the written 
record, but in total in the minds of all geologists. The geologist who has surveyed an 
area develops a mental picture of the geology more complete than that shown on maps 
and described in papers. Much is tacit knowledge which is acquired through practice 
and cannot be articulated explicitly (Kuhn, 1962) - known but not expressed. For 
example, you might instantly recognize a specimen which you could not identify from 
the most exhaustive description, just as you learned to ride a bicycle by demonstration 
(transferring knowledge held in procedural memory), not by written instruction. In a 
discussion, or a field excursion, much can be learned that could never be written 
down. The importance of tacit knowledge means that education, training and learning 
throughout a scientist's career need demonstration, discussion and directed experience 
- to communicate what we cannot express. 
 
A reminder can recall forgotten memories. Hence the menus on a computer screen. 
Recognition of a command is easier than remembering the exact wording of a 
computer instruction. A valuable feature of an information system may therefore be to 
“jog the memory”, to present cues and analogies that can stimulate ideas in the pool of 
tacit knowledge. A second valuable feature can be the ability to access the tacit 
knowledge of others through discussion and inquiry. A third feature of the system 
could be the use of images and video demonstrations to illustrate, for example, the 
procedures used in collecting samples, or the precise points examined on an outcrop. 
These could clarify a narrative account, and would help others to repeat and test the 
observations. 
 
1.6 Knowledge-based and rules-based investigation 
 
Examples presented to students (I 3) are not typical of the procedures of experienced 
geologists surveying an unknown area. During an initial survey, a comprehensive set 
of observations is likely to be made and recorded, if only to avoid the cost of 
revisiting each outcrop. For a graduate research project, a local, self-contained 
problem might be sought, preferably with significance in a wider context. The 
abundance of such problems in geoscience makes it an attractive subject to study. On 
the other hand, the search for oil is more likely to employ techniques that are well 
established on a global scale, in tune with the uniform business objectives. The fact 
that the model is well defined before the investigation begins (being based on a clear 
user requirement) increases the scope for rules-based activity and so for automation.  
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This points to a distinction between exploratory investigation and systematic pre-
planned investigation. The first is knowledge-based, starting from some 
preconception of the geological setting and developing and extending the explanation 
with each new observation. Evidence is constantly sought, by new observations or 
reworking data, to confirm or modify the current interpretation and choose the next 
step of the investigation in the context of growing background knowledge. A narrative 
account is built in episodic memory. The second is rules-based, where the pattern of 
the investigation is decided before work starts. In contrast to the exploratory search of 
the knowledge-based project, the rules-based project is analytical, studying known 
relationships by collecting and studying appropriate data, following a well-defined 
model. Standard procedures are specified, and instructions set out for following them. 
The resulting data are therefore consistent, and can be compared with one another and 
with data from other projects that followed similar rules. Short-term memories are 
recorded, and can be accurately recreated from the database. 
 
Rules-based projects can be well suited to quantitative measurement and extensive 
instrumentation. The seismic investigations of the North Sea, and downhole logs from 
the subsequent drilling, provide examples of data collected by instruments according 
to pre-defined rules. Their consistency makes them particularly helpful in revealing 
regional pattern. A rigid, pre-determined structure can also extend the reach of the 
designers of an investigation by delegating data collection to instruments or 
methodical human data gatherers. The plan is inflexible and cannot readily be 
adjusted in the light of the initial findings. 
 
Knowledge-based projects have fewer precedents to guide the activity. They explore 
the unknown, and procedures must be modified as more is learned.  The students who 
arrive at the outcrop not knowing what they are going to see are in this position. In 
fact, projects are likely to involve both rules-based and knowledge-based procedures. 
For example, a seismic survey may collect data according to a predetermined scheme, 
but the interpretation of those data is knowledge-based, evolving as ideas are tested 
and knowledge of the geology of the area grows. The student, carrying out an 
exploratory investigation, may nevertheless follow predetermined conventions when 
measuring strike and dip, and might even randomize the sampling procedure to aid 
subsequent analysis. Every rules-based activity is ultimately set in the knowledge-
based framework of the science as a whole. 
 
The distinction between knowledge-based and rules-based activities is important in 
the present context, because (work on artificial intelligence notwithstanding) 
knowledge remains largely the preserve of the human being.  The machine, on the 
other hand, can be adept at following rules. Bear in mind, however, that automation 
can support free thinking and trial and error. An IT response to knowledge-based 
activities is to use flexible multimedia, creating fully connected and searchable 
documents.  An IT response to rules-based activities, on the other hand, is a 
rigorously defined model and database supporting standardized applications. It makes 
full use of instruments for data collection and analysis.   
 
The computer is well suited to accurate long-term storage of complex images and 
detailed tabular data, such as lists of fossils or results of geochemical analyses; but the 
brain (where accurate detail is restricted to short-term memory) is not. The brain is 
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well adapted to handling, within a frame of existing background knowledge, the loose 
structure of descriptions, analogies and explanatory reasoning typical of a narrative 
account; but the computer is not. 
 
IT should aim to harmonize knowledge-based human skills with rules-based computer 
modeling. As the approaches overlap and combine, the information system should 
optimize the abilities of both. An important part of the solution is interactive 
computing - a conversation between the user and the machine, in which the screen 
display is modified rapidly in response to instructions or decisions entered usually by 
keyboard or mouse. The ability of the computer to follow rules quickly and accurately 
is complemented by the ability of the scientist to use background knowledge to 
control the progress of the activity. 
 
1.7 Modes of thought 
 
The various information types (text, spatial, structured, tacit) are handled differently 
by the brain. Each supports a different style of thought, communication and IT 
system. We use them, separately or together, to model knowledge and information in 
various modes of thought and investigation, such as the following: 
 
 Narrative - one can pass on information, or develop a point of view, by telling 
a story. As Francis Bacon pointed out in 1652 (see Leatherdale, 1974), one can revisit 
the reasons for reaching a conclusion by going over in one's mind the events that led 
to it. Each part of the narrative depends on the story so far. By telling the tale to 
others, they too may follow the line of reasoning. 
 
 Temporal - geological explanations trace the course of past events, relating 
observations to a conceptual time sequence of past conditions (states) and processes. 
 
 Spatial - geoscience maps and images provide the means to locate 
observations and link them to spatial pattern and spatial relationships. To understand 
the pattern of ice flow, or sequence and extent of lava flows, the students (I 3) were 
led naturally to a map. The meaning of the observations depends on their spatial 
context. 
 
 Demonstration - narrative description is more powerful if augmented by 
actually demonstrating what happened, in the field or laboratory (the ostensive 
approach). For a full picture, it may be desirable to retrace the work, and so share the 
experience, of an earlier investigator. 
 
 Quantitative - the benefits of precise measurement have wide application and 
are immediately obvious in, for example, hydrocarbons exploration, where detailed 
prediction of the form and properties of the strata is required, leading to estimates of 
the location and magnitude of the oil and gas reserves. 
 
 Statistical - statistical theory provides a rigorous basis for marshaling 
complex evidence for testing hypotheses, and estimating probabilities and uncertainty, 
by computation from appropriately sampled observations and measurements. 
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 Process-response - the concept that physical, chemical and biological 
processes operated in the past as they do now, is the basis for much geoscientific 
thinking. A coherent picture of past processes should be internally consistent and 
should predict responses (consequences) comparable to those of present-day systems. 
 
 Experimental - some processes and responses can be explored by experiment, 
that is, under circumstances that the scientist can control, leading to a more exact 
understanding of the relationships.  
 
 Trial and error - where the course that an investigation will take is not clear, 
a heuristic approach may be adopted, trying out a range of possibilities, following 
those which seem most successful, and modifying them as more is learned. 
 
The information type and mode of thought play a large part in determining whether IT 
methods are relevant and which methods are appropriate. Conversely, technology 
influences the ways we think and the combinations of modes of investigation. 
 
1.8 The need for a Geoscience Markup Language 
 
This chapter is concerned with where we want to go, not how we get there. However, 
the requirement may be clearer if we have a mechanism in mind. Conventional 
methods of recording information have deficiencies. The poor connectivity enforced 
by earlier technology results in high redundancy and inflexibility. Processes to 
manage, manipulate and explain information are frozen along with their 
representation. Change is cumbersome, because minor corrections in the literature are 
easily overlooked, and when ideas change, the full knock-on effects on other work are 
seldom obvious. 
 
We are looking for a mechanism that can offer better facilities for new investigations, 
while incorporating legacy material. A markup language could be one approach to 
improving communication. It can represent conventional narrative text, but can also 
include tags. Unlike HTML, where the tags control presentation and links, XML (E 6) 
can also tag words or sections by topic (this is a fossil name, this is the section on 
structural geology). Presentation is handled separately through a style sheet and can 
be controlled by the reader.  
 
As its name indicates, XML is extensible. The ability of users to define their own tags 
could result in a large and unwieldy language. Therefore, specific dialects of XML 
have grown up and been partly standardized within subject areas. Thus Chemical 
Markup Language (CML) can tag chemical formulae, and display them, or models of 
the molecular structure, with a choice of conventions and notations. Other dialects 
have been developed for fields such as mathematics and music, to handle their 
specialist notations and offer flexibility in presentation. 
 
A Geoscience Markup Language (GML) could also be a specialist subset of XML, 
and thus have the ability to tag words or sections (modules) of the text to reflect their 
topic. Such modules could be linked to others, within the document or elsewhere. We 
think of the conventional literature as subdivided into encyclopedias, books, serials, 
reports, notes, maps, and so on. The subdivisions are based on physical form and 
process of delivery. Instead, we could visualize a GML document as a collection of 
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modules brought together for a particular purpose, with many of them reusable in 
other contexts. Authorship takes on a different meaning where modules are assembled 
from many sources, possibly offering alternative explanations of the same 
phenomena. 
 
A markup language, however, also offers the possibility of linking text closely and 
selectively to modules from, say, metadata, data, software, models, demonstrations on 
video or sources of expert advice. Many of these would be accessed through a 
database management system or a GIS (E 5), although this need not be apparent to the 
casual user. A module could be displayed in different ways to meet individual needs 
(a table of data or a graph, a contour map or a perspective view). It would be an 
integral part of the document. But it would also offer the possibility of moving to and 
from a different environment, such as a GIS to explore the spatial context, or a 
database for comparison with analogous datasets from other investigations. Another 
user option could be to select the level of generalization, while retaining the ability to 
drill down to additional detail when required. Change to one module would be seen 
by all modules connected to it, and knock-on effects could be traced through the links. 
 
The technology is largely in place, and starting to operate in some other subjects. 
Such languages immediately offer greater flexibility and expressive power to the 
author. Geoscientists have special needs for interworking with spatial, historic and 
stratigraphic information, and have their own vocabulary and procedures. They could 
therefore justify a separate dialect of XML. But there is a long and painful learning 
curve, and geoscientists will be involved in much trial and much error before a robust 
solution for everyday use can emerge. 
 
With an appropriate markup language, linkage to the underlying context of 
assumptions, laws and hypotheses could be recorded and therefore the effects of 
changes in the underlying ideas could be clarified. To take this further, however, we 
need to consider the process of building knowledge from information, and the object-
oriented approach that stems from this. 
 
2. Processes and the repository 
 
2.1 Explanation 
 
Having looked at communication (J 1), the next question is how scientists explain 
their observations and make sense of streams of observational data. How do we build 
knowledge from information? The Encyclopedia Britannica (1973) is again helpful 
with its entry on Scientific Method, where it defines the pursuit of science as “the 
search for knowledge and understanding through formulation of the laws of nature.” 
The theoretical function of science is that of providing explanations of natural 
phenomena by discovering relationships between these phenomena and other events. 
These relationships fall under general laws that enable us to make predictions as to 
what events to expect in particular circumstances, and sometimes, by controlling the 
circumstances, to ensure that these events will occur. The practical function of 
science, that of enabling us to adjust our lives to nature and, sometimes, nature to our 
lives, thus derives from its intellectual function - that of explaining phenomena by 
means of scientific laws. 
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A starting point for scientific explanation is classification (systematically assigning 
objects to categories based on their properties). Recognizing an object as a sediment 
or an intrusion has implications about its geological behavior. The words used to 
name objects are nouns. Adjectives, like red, angular or hard, describe their attributes 
but are less useful for classification, saying little about how the objects behave. The 
students' visit to Salisbury Crags (I 3) began by distinguishing, identifying and 
naming the sedimentary and intrusive rocks, relating them to their behavior in the 
geological past. The extension of this activity to formal data analysis is described in  
H 3. 
 
Scientific discovery involves finding hypotheses (suppositions made as a starting 
point for further investigation) that could be refuted by further experience (see 
Popper, 1996), but which nevertheless survive testing by observation or if possible by 
experiment (observations made in circumstances over which the scientist has 
control). A hypothesis in I 3 was that the rocks of the cliff face are part of an intrusive 
sill. This was tested by thinking about what additional observational evidence might 
be found and then looking for it. Although the original events are beyond the reach of 
experiment, a detailed model of aspects of the processes, say, the baking of the 
sandstone, might be tested experimentally given appropriate facilities to replicate the 
high pressures and temperatures involved. The purpose may be to find more laws 
about the behavior of the things we can observe or to incorporate the results in a 
broader explanatory theory. 
 
Scientific laws enable us to organize our thinking into coherent systems as well as to 
make predictions. The laws are at many different levels of generality, arranged in a 
hierarchical system in which laws at a low level are logical consequences of sets of 
laws at a higher level, and so on. The lowest-level laws are general propositions 
whose instances are directly observable facts, but higher-level laws may be theoretical 
concepts in a wider system explaining new phenomena. Explanations in geoscience 
may present the observed situation as a logical consequence of preceding events and 
of more fundamental regularities, such as the laws of physics, operating on initial 
conditions of a geographical or historical kind. If we view the process of successive 
explanation as the erection of a hierarchy of laws of increasing generality, there is no 
reason to prevent different hierarchies from being constructed in different ways to 
explain the same phenomena (Kent, 1978). 
 
2.2 Analogy 
 
“To explain the origin of hypotheses I have a hypothesis to present. It is that 
hypotheses are always suggested through analogy. Consequential relations of nature 
are infinite in variety and he who is acquainted with the largest number has the 
broadest basis for the analogic suggestion of hypotheses” (Gilbert, 1896, quoted by 
Leatherdale, 1974). 
 
Analogy is the resemblance in some particulars between things otherwise unlike. 
Analogy can be a resemblance in an ensemble of qualities, or of properties or 
attributes. In metaphor, the mind sees and expresses an analogy. The metaphorical use 
of language in science arises when familiar vocabulary is extended to describe novel 
insights and interpretations. Thus in coining the term electric current, ideas were 
carried across from the familiar current in a river. Metaphor, according to the Oxford 
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English Dictionary, is “the figure of speech in which a name or descriptive term is 
transferred to some object different from, but analogous to, that to which it is properly 
applicable.” Analogy in logic, according to the same source, is the process of 
reasoning from parallel cases, based on the assumption that if things have some 
similar attributes, other attributes will be similar. Most of the truly fruitful facts about 
nature, Leatherdale (1974) suggests, have been discovered by reasoning from 
analogy. 
 
According to Leatherdale, explanation involves an inescapable use of analogy. This is 
partly because the unobserved part of the description in an explanation, being 
unobserved, cannot be directly described. It must be verbalized and conceptualized in 
terms of other experiences. Explanation works by analogy of content as well as of 
structure. When the analogy is well marked in terms of content, or observable 
characteristics, we speak of a model. The model is an essential tool, in that it enables 
us to think about the unfamiliar in terms of the familiar.  
 
Models enable us to construct and meaningfully describe the concepts of theories in 
the same way as metaphors enable us to think about or describe things or concepts not 
normally describable in a literal vocabulary. Because they function in this way, they 
give meaning to, and thus an explanation of, theories. This in turn enables them to 
connect theory with observation and experiment. Thus, in the belief that past 
processes obeyed the same physical and chemical laws as today, analogies are drawn 
in geology with present-day processes, as in comparing an unconformity to a present-
day erosion surface, in seeing finer crystals as indicating more rapid cooling, or in 
explaining changes in sandstone petrography as baking against an igneous intrusion. 
 
 
2.3 Model and reality 
 
Geoscience investigations are usually concerned, not with creating a new model, but 
with refining an existing one. They build on earlier work and must be closely linked 
to past records. The model is concerned not only with what is there, but also how it 
came about - how the operation of physical, chemical and biological processes, in a 
sequence of events in geological time, brought about the observed consequences. The 
model influences the classification of objects. For instance, the geologist sees an 
important distinction between a granite and an overlying pebble conglomerate, despite 
their similar composition and appearance, because they formed in quite different 
circumstances. 
 
As pointed out earlier (B 4), the neat and tidy classification of rocks shown on a 
geological map or reported in the literature is unrealistic. The overlap, ambiguity and 
uncertainty so painfully apparent in the field have been banished. Crisply bounded 
areas of uniformity have somehow replaced the fuzzy boundaries and mish-mash of 
intercalated variation. Goodchild (1992) suggested that: “We need better methods for 
dealing with the world as a set of overlapping continua, instead of forcing the world 
into the mould of rigidly bounded objects.” Quantitative techniques (F) are a possible 
candidate for representing the geological “continuum”, although Mandelbrot pointed 
out that continuity is conspicuous by its absence in natural phenomena (G 6). We now 
need to consider whether the categories are necessary, or an artifact imposed by 
inadequate technology. 
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The distinction between model and reality is an important one. The model must be 
tuned to human thought while reflecting something useful about the real world. A 
continuous model, such as a contour map, may be an appropriate representation of 
discontinuous reality, as long as the discrepancy is not important in the context in 
which the model is being used. The danger comes when the limitations are forgotten 
and questions that cannot be properly answered by the model, such as the length of a 
coastline (G 6), are addressed within it. Separate models relying on different 
assumptions are required for different purposes. For example, a statistical model 
might regard a process as deterministic and predictable, together with a superimposed 
random element for which only the statistical properties (as opposed to individual 
instances) could be predicted. On the other hand, a dynamic nonlinear model might 
regard the process as deterministic (in the sense of following natural laws) but 
unpredictable because small variations in the initial conditions could lead to a large 
change in the outcome (Baker and Gollub, 1996). 
 
There is another issue. The model must be one that the available data and technology 
can support. New IT solutions extend the range of models that are realistically 
available. Looking at the computer display illustrated in Fig. 1, for example, there is a 
clear possibility of modeling three-dimensional rock bodies in new ways. The image 
can show discontinuous areas. Zooming in to part of the image could cause the areas 
to fragment and reveal more detail, as discontinuous as before. The scope of the 
model in Fig. 1 is limited. It is a stunning image when seen in full motion on the 
screen, and no doubt serves its purpose well. But it is tied to just one set of properties, 
related to acoustic impedance within a body of rock.  
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Display of 3d seismic data. Animation (not available here) enables you to move through the data 
volume to follow structural and stratigraphic trends. Reproduced by permission of Landmark Graphics 
Corporation. More at http://www.lgc.com/ 
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Take another example. Satellite imagery records a number of related properties, 
namely separate bands of the electromagnetic spectrum measured simultaneously. The 
properties can be analyzed quantitatively and, for example, classes based on 
discriminant analysis (F 5) can be displayed (Fig. 2). They again serve their purpose 
well, and are a useful reminder of the variation hidden in conventional cartography. 
But they complement and extend earlier methods, rather than displacing them. One 
reason is that three-dimensional seismic surveys and satellite imagery are unusual in 
their dense and regular sampling patterns that make detailed analysis possible. 
Relating them to other variables sampled on other patterns by other means calls for 
background knowledge and human interpretation. Limitations of access and 
measuring procedures mean that the data for most variables are inevitably inaccurate 
and incomplete. 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. Classification of land use from a satellite image. Example of satellite imagery classified by an 
iterative technique. The user indicates typical areas for each class, the computer extrapolates by 
quantitative analysis of the spectral bands and displays the color image, the user corrects and extends 
the classification, and so on. Published by permission of Rockware. More on 
http://www.rockware.com/catalog/pages/dimple.html 
 
Our aims cannot be solely descriptive, for geoscience is concerned with recreating a 
story from incomplete evidence. It is a story about objects, identified by nouns, given 
meaning by the models in which they participate, and their properties, described by 
adjectives of qualitative assessment or quantitative measurement. The creation of the 
main object classes, such as stratigraphic units, and the assignment of instances to 
these classes, seldom depend on subtle quantitative comparisons. They depend on 
drawing analogies and spotting crucial features. They depend on building up a pattern 
of behavior of objects within models and relating them to a place in the overall 
scheme of things (the current paradigm), more likely tied to fuzzy concepts than to 
measurable properties. 
 
Even where an example or instance of an object class is described, such as the 
lithology of a core or well sample, a descriptive term (say, biohermal dolomite) may 
place it in a category that reflects an impression of many characteristics. We thus 
benefit from the ability of the human brain to recognize complex patterns specific to 
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the context. This lends itself to narrative description, not to point-by-point 
quantitative comparison. From an initial broad appreciation of the situation, we 
observe and describe to extend our model. It is not difficult to think of examples 
where several conceptual process models are invoked. In the example at I 3, they dealt 
with sedimentary deposition, igneous activity, regional tilting and glacial erosion. The 
processes they refer to are worldwide. But we were looking at their consequences 
within a small area. Without conscious deliberation, we selected objects (the rock 
bodies) that took part, with the same definition, in each of the models. We naturally 
placed the objects and the processes at appropriate positions within the same 
framework of space and geological time. In M 2.3, we look at spatial and stratigraphic 
models which make that framework explicit for computer processing. Meantime, we 
note that objects seem to be chosen by a subtle process that depends on the intuition 
and background knowledge of the human mind. 
 
At a general level, object classification and identification (H 5) are well suited to our 
thought processes, and may be assisted but not greatly changed by new technology. 
Quantitative methods, on the other hand, are well suited to computer processing. They 
are appropriate where there is a clear physical model that can be represented 
mathematically, as in seismic processing, gravity corrections, and so on. Their crucial 
contribution may lie, not in interpreting the geology, but in clarifying the geological 
significance of the records by removing extraneous effects (F). Where wider 
conclusions follow quantitative analysis of the raw data, as for example in seismic 
stratigraphy, they may result from non-quantitative reasoning. The new insights 
nevertheless depended on technology extending the reach of human thought. 
 
Subtle variations in properties or composition (M 2.3) may be detected by quantitative 
analysis (F 5), as, for example, the identification of distinct lava flows from 
petrographic studies in the example of I 3. Statistical reasoning, based on randomly 
sampled measurements, can be a surprisingly powerful approach, even when based on 
the apparently weak concept of testing whether observed patterns were likely to have 
arisen by chance. 
 
IT offers the opportunity to build models that span the modes of human thought (J 
1.7), combining their individual strengths. Quantitative reasoning, such as a computer 
process that simulates states and events, can be embedded in a narrative that explains 
its significance, limitations and context. Quantitative reasoning can be linked to 
cartographic and spatial thinking by computer visualization. Individual measurements 
gain meaning from the context of spatial pattern. Human insight, intuition and modes 
of thought remain supreme, but can be expressed in new ways. The wide range of 
models which IT supports can lead to better understanding, provided their properties 
and the limitations of their analogies are clearly appreciated. 
 
2.4 The object-oriented approach 
 
Our thought processes, constrained by technology, ultimately determine how we 
record and handle data. The object-oriented approach attempts to match those 
processes with IT procedures. According to Coad and Yourdon (1991), three methods 
of organization pervade our thinking about the real world: 
• differentiation of experience into particular objects and their attributes 
• distinction between whole objects and their component parts 
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• distinction between different classes of objects. 
 
It is not difficult to think of examples from geoscience in terms of rock types, fossils, 
stratigraphic units, geological processes and so on. For instance, here is an outcrop 
(object), somewhat overgrown and deeply weathered (attributes), beside the river and 
under the bridge (spatial relationships). The outcrop (whole object) consists of beds of 
sandstone (component parts), containing grains of quartz and mica (components). It is 
interbedded (spatial relationship) with shales (different object class), and contains 
(spatial relationship) fossils (different object class).  
 
Reality is a seamless web of infinite complexity, but the human mind can cope with 
only a limited amount of information at one time. Abstraction reduces the complexity 
by separating out a model dealing with a small number of things that are important to 
the purpose in hand. All words, language and data are abstractions and incomplete 
descriptions of the real world. There is thus no correct model of a situation, only 
adequate or inadequate ones. An object model describes the structure of objects in a 
system, their identity, relationships with other objects, attributes and operations. 
Common relationships are being (as in sandstone is a sedimentary rock), having (as in 
this sandstone has graded bedding) and doing. A dynamic model describes those 
aspects of a system concerned with time and the sequencing of operations - events 
that mark changes, states and organization, whereas a functional model captures 
what a system does, without regard for how or when it is done. 
 
Language, images, quantitative modeling and demonstration all share the tendency to 
see the world in terms of objects, attributes and processes, from which may spring the 
noun, adjective and verb structure of our language (Leatherdale, 1974). Thus, 
communication in geoscience, by whatever means, concerns processes (which cause 
things to change) and objects (the things of interest), the object classes, and their 
attributes (properties, composition, relationships and behavior). An object should not 
be constrained by information type. One object, such as a borehole description, might 
comprise a text description and a geographic reference. It thus includes both text and 
spatial information types, which might be stored separately and accessed by different 
software. Many of the objects invoked in a narrative have second homes in other, 
possibly more structured environments. For example, a paper describing a fossil 
locality might include a list of species that could also appear in a paleontological 
register, and could be plotted on a map of fossil distribution, and linked to a 
stratigraphic table. The user must therefore interface with distributed objects, related 
to various topics, and represented by a mixture of information types. 
 
Object classes, by definition, belong in a hierarchical sequence (H 5), inheriting 
attributes from classes farther up the hierarchy. Thus sandstone may inherit properties 
from its superclass sedimentary rocks. A data model (I 2.2) can assemble object 
classes into topics such as (examples in brackets): stratigraphic (formation), 
bibliographic (document), petrographic (thin section), paleontological (specimen of 
fossil). The topics are not mutually exclusive, so that a fossil description could be 
both a paleontological object and a bibliographic object. Within each topic, rules and 
standards can ensure that information is consistent and comparable. The fossil, as a 
paleontological object, is named according to the rules of fossil nomenclature, 
described according to paleontological conventions. The fossil description, as a 
bibliographic object, is cataloged according to international rules. A single object may 
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thus be firmly embedded in at least two topic areas. We return later (L 6.1) to the 
application of object-oriented methods in analysis, design, programming and database 
work. 
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